Intergenerational transfers of human capital: evidence on two types of education externalities. by Sharada Weir
 
Intergenerational Transfers of Human Capital: 








Centre for the Study of African Economies 
Department of Economics, University of Oxford 
 
Manor Road Building, Oxford  OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom 
 
Office: +44 1865 271 084 









Abstract Low enrolment and educational wastage are serious problems in sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly in rural areas of Ethiopia where participation in formal education is extremely 
poor. An aspect of both problems is late entry to primary school, which has dire consequences 
for educational attainment, most notably for girls. This paper provides evidence on the extent 
of low enrolment and late entry for a sample of rural households and examines the 
determinants of each. In particular, the importance of parental and neighbourhood education 
are considered. We find that the education of both parents is important to enrolment and 
starting time. Furthermore, education of women in the neighbourhood increases the 
probability of enrolment. This suggests that there are two types of external benefit of 
schooling in terms of intergenerational transfers of human capital. Given the large gender bias 
in enrolments in rural Ethiopia, these findings have important implications for educational 
policy.  
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A strikingly low percentage of school-aged children in Ethiopia participate in formal 
education, even when compared with other low-income African countries. In 1994, for 
example, the primary gross enrolment ratio (GER) for Ethiopia was 31 percent, while the 
average primary GER for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole was 74 percent (UNESCO 1997). 
The 1984 Population and Housing Census shows that this poor performance is attributable to 
very low enrolment in rural areas, as universal primary education appears to have been 
achieved in the urban centres (Office of the Population and Housing Census Commission 
1989). Compounding this problem is the prevalence of delayed entry to primary school and 
other aspects of educational wastage.  
 
There are a number of potential consequences of low enrolment and educational wastage. 
Children who start school late may have more difficulty learning than younger children. For 
various reasons, they may be unable to progress as far in school as would have been possible 
had they started on time. This is particularly true for girls, who may be forced to leave school 
at the onset of puberty or upon marriage (Rose, et al. 1997). Education is often a prerequisite 
for skilled, off-farm employment. Moreover, Weir (1999) finds significant benefits of primary 
schooling in terms of household farm production and efficiency in rural Ethiopia. 
Consequently, uneducated or under-educated individuals not only lack the skills and 
qualifications necessary to obtain formal sector wage employment but are also at a 
disadvantage as farmers when faced with changing agricultural technologies and markets.  
 
There is a small but growing literature on the determinants of enrolment and late entry in 
Ethiopia and other parts of Africa (see Weir 1998). Both enrolment and late entry are 
hypothesised to depend upon a combination of supply and demand factors, including quality 
and availability of schools, direct and opportunity costs of schooling under conditions of 
severely constrained credit, and perceived benefits of schooling. Family background, 
including the education of the mother and father, is also likely to play an important role, since 
the decision whether and when to enrol in school is usually made by a child’s parents. 
However, parents are not the principal or sole beneficiaries of a child’s education. Indeed, the 
child and the child’s future family may benefit most from his or her education, and not the 
parents. This is particularly the case for girls, who are usually expected to marry and confer 
the benefits of their schooling upon their husband’s family, rather than their own. There are 
two related consequences of this imperfect correspondence between investors and 
beneficiaries. Firstly, too little education may be provided from the point of view of the child 
and the other beneficiaries. Secondly, if parental education is an input into children’s 
schooling, there are externality benefits inherent in the intergenerational transfer of human 
capital. This is one type of externality benefit. A second possible externality benefit of 
schooling occurs when enrolment decisions are influenced by the education of friends and 
neighbours. The absolute and relative importance of human capital within and outside the 
household to enrolment decisions is an area which has not received attention in the literature 
on the determinants of enrolment and late entry in the developing world.  
 
Mothers and fathers may make different contributions to a child’s human capital. There is 
much evidence from the developing world literature to suggest the importance of women’s 
education to the health and well-being of her family (see, for example, Behrman and Stacey 
1997). This may also be true in the case of schooling. Given the extremely low rates of school 
participation, the prevalence of late entry, and the striking gender gap in enrolments in rural  
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Ethiopia, missed opportunities to benefit from the education of girls must not be ignored by 
policy-makers. Such social benefits of schooling may complement the production 
externalities documented by Weir and Knight (2000a and 2000b) in terms of farm 
productivity and the adoption and spread of agricultural innovations. Educated parents will 
not only be more productive in their own activities, they will raise more educated children 
who can expect to enjoy greater productivity themselves.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to use data on parental education, attitudes and skills to 
illuminate the size and extent of external benefits of parents’ education in terms of better 
schooling outcomes of the current cohort of school-age children. We will also attempt to 
explain the source of schooling externalities in terms of women’s power in the home versus 
skills and attitudes acquired in school. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses 
our definition of externality benefits of schooling. Section 3 describes the household survey 
data used. Section 4 investigates the extent of school participation and educational wastage in 
the sample. In sections 5 and 6, the determinants of enrolment and of delayed starting are 
estimated. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Externality Benefits of Education Defined 
 
Externalities are usually defined simply as the effects of the actions of one economic agent 
upon another agent (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995, 352). An externality benefit 
occurs when one agent creates a benefit for another agent but is not paid for it (Koutsoyiannis 
1979, 541-42). We refine this definition somewhat to include all the effects of an economic 
action which are not fully taken into account by the actor: these are the potential benefits and 
costs that accrue beyond those internalised by the decision-taker. The externality benefits of 
education may be various and considerable. Parents who invest in the education of their 
children may fail to take into account a number of benefits. There will then be too little 
investment in education from a social point of view.  
 
First, parents may not recognise the economic benefits that will accrue to the person being 
educated - although researchers, in estimating these benefits, normally assume that they are 
perceived and internalised. For example, education increases farm productivity and efficiency 
(Weir 1999), but some households may view the benefits of schooling only in terms of access 
to off-farm employment. Hence, too little education will be provided because the full private 
benefits of schooling are not recognised. Second, the investor may discount the benefit 
accruing to the investee, particularly if the investee is expected to leave the household. This 
may be especially true for a girl insofar as the benefits of her education will be transferred to 
her husband’s household.  
 
Benefits may be transferred from one generation to another in the same household or between 
households in the same neighbourhood. Altruism is possible within the household but rather 
less likely between households. Thus, even if parents realise that by investing in schooling 
they will create a role model for other households, they are not expected to increase their 
educational investment on that basis. Once again, there will be too little education from a 








The data for this study are drawn from the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS), 
conducted by the Department of Economics, Addis Ababa University, in collaboration with 
the Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford, and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, in 1994, and Education Sub-Sample Survey (ES-SS), 
conducted by the author, in 1995. 
 
The ERHS covered 1477 households in 18 Peasant Associations (villages) spanning 15 
woredas (districts) in six regions. Six of the sites, primarily located in drought-prone areas, 
had previously been surveyed by IFPRI in 1989. The remaining nine were chosen by the 
Department of Economics with the assistance of Ministry of Agriculture officials in 1993 to 
reflect most of the important agro-economic variations found in rural Ethiopia. Together, the 
15 sites provide a realistic mix of cultivation categories and standard of living strata. Brief 
site descriptions are given in Croppenstedt and Demeke (1997); Bevan and Pankhurst (1996) 
provide more detailed information.  
 
Each household was surveyed three times within approximately twelve months (early in 1994, 
later in 1994 and early in 1995), providing a picture of both current activities and the 
household's historical background (Dercon and Krishnan 1994). Questions were asked on a 
wide range of issues affecting rural Ethiopian households, including production (crop output, 
land, labour and other inputs, and prices), consumption, assets, credit, migration, 
anthropometric measures and health. The first round also included a few key questions on 
educational status and attainment. Further information on education was provided in the 
second round of the survey conducted in 1994/95.  
 
Owing to the scope of the ERHS, the volume and breadth of questions asked on education-
related issues was necessarily limited. Information on investment in human capital from the 
ERHS was supplemented by a purpose-designed survey of household human resources in four 
of the 15 sites (Weir 1995). This sub-sample survey was conducted in one round during 
August 1995. The ES-SS provides in-depth educational histories of all household members, 
as well as information on current student time use, expenditures on schooling, parental 
attitudes toward education, reasoning ability, and cognitive skills accumulation and retention.  
 
Within the four sites selected, all households covered by the ERHS were surveyed. No further 
selection took place. Since the same households were visited for the ES-SS as during the 
three rounds of the ERHS, it has been possible to match information from this smaller, 
focused survey of human resources with that from the broader survey. Together, these surveys 
provide sufficient data with which to investigate factors influencing enrolment and late school 





4. Scope and Scale of Low Enrolment and Educational Wastage  
 
Gross vs. Net Enrolment in the ERHS 
 
The first and second rounds of the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey contained questions on 
educational status which have been used to construct gross and net enrolment ratios by sex 
and level of schooling. The gross enrolment ratio (GER) is the number of children of all ages 
who are currently enrolled in school divided by the total number of children who are of 
school-going age in the sample. The net enrolment ratio (NER) is the number of school-aged 
children who are currently enrolled in school divided by the total number of children of 
school-going age. The primary school-aged population is defined to include children aged 
from 7 to 12, and the secondary school-aged population is comprised of those aged 13 to 18.  
 
Comparing gross and net enrolment ratios provides some information on the prevalence of 
older children in the student population. When the numerator includes children who are older 
(or younger) than the school-age population included in the denominator, GERs are 
artificially inflated and offer an upwardly-biased picture of participation. NERs offer a more 
realistic assessment of participation among the school-age cohort.  
 
Table 1 shows GERs for primary (grades 1-6) and secondary (grades 7-12) school. The 
average GERs for all 15 sites together are very low at both levels of schooling and indicate a 
serious gender bias in favour of boys. Enrolment in primary school as a percentage of the 
school-aged population was only 24 percent in the sites surveyed. The overall participation 
rate for primary school-aged boys is approximately twice that of girls. Secondary school 
participation is less than half that at the primary level.  
 
NERs provide an indication of the extent of over-aging of enrolment in the sample. Only 
those students who are of the appropriate age group for their level of schooling are included 
in the calculations. Evidence from the ERHS shows that this is a serious problem (Table 2). 
Only 11 percent of primary school-aged children and just over five percent of secondary 
school-aged children are enrolled in the appropriate level of schooling.
1  
 
Taking the ratio of net to gross enrolment ratios gives the percentage of those enrolled who are 
in the appropriate age cohort for their level of schooling. On average for all sites, less than 50 
percent of students are between 7 and 18 years of age. Clearly, the problem over over-age 
enrolment is considerable. The analysis of NERs suggests that in a country such as Ethiopia, 
where primary education is not mandatory, gross enrolment ratios may provide a misleading, 
overly optimistic, picture of school participation.  
 
To summarise, gross and net enrolment ratios calculated for households in the ERHS reflect 
those for the country as a whole and are low in comparison with other countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, the overall figures mask a large difference by sex. The figures reveal a 
substantial gap in enrolment in favour of boys. The difference between gross and net enrolment 
rates indicates that there is a serious problem of over-ageing of enrolment for children of both 
sexes.  
                                                            
1 Children younger than the usual school-going age are also omitted from calculations of net enrolment 
ratios. Re-calculation of the NERs for all 15 sites to include younger enrolled children give NERs which are very 
close to the figures presented in Table 6.2, suggesting that most of the difference between NERs and GERs is 




Evidence from the ES-SS 
 
Detailed education histories were obtained from 636 respondents of the ES-SS who are either 
currently attending school or who have been to school in the past.
2 Information was gathered 
on the extent of late entry to school, absences of one year or more from school, grade 
repetition and premature exit. Respondents were also asked to give the most important 
reasons for late entry, extended absences and dropping out.  
 
Over 45 percent of respondents said that they had delayed starting primary school by one year 
or more after their peers entered school. Delays of two to four years were the most common, 
accounting for almost half of those who reported having postponed entry. Several respondents 
reported starting school more than 10 years later than their peers. The average length of time 
by which entry was delayed was five years beyond the peer group. It is useful to ask 
respondents whether they started later than their peers, since there may be different 
conventions for starting school in different places and at different times. However, the 
problem of delayed entry appears to be more serious when the benchmark used is the official 
government starting age, seven, rather than the typical peer group starting age. Over 90 
percent of our sample started school after age seven. If, as some recent research on early 
childhood development suggests, there is a critical period for learning (for a review see: Bruer 
1997), actual years delayed may be more relevant than years delayed in relation to the peer 
group. Table 3 provides a comparison of descriptive statistics for actual and perceived delays 
in starting school.  
 
There is some variation in the tendency to delay entry to primary school by site. Over 60 
percent of respondents in Sirbaban Godeti (located in Aada District, near Debre Zeit and 
Mojo) and almost 60 percent of respondents in Turufe Kechema (located in Shashemene 
District near the town of Shashemene) had delayed entry by one year or more after their peers 
started school, whereas only 30 and just over 40 percent, respectively, had delayed in Imdibir 
Haya Gasha (a Gurage village in Cheha District) and Aze Deboa (a Kembata village in 
Kedida Gamila District). Average years that respondents reported delaying beyond their peers 
were also higher in Sirbana Godeti and Turufe Ketchema than in Imdibir and Aze Deboa. 
However, the proportion who actually delayed beyond age seven is above 80 percent for all 
sites.  
 
The most common first reason given for delaying entry was that the child was needed on the 
farm or for other household activities. Distance to school was also an important 
consideration. Direct cost of schooling was an important second reason for delaying, along 
with the need to work for wages or care for sick or elderly household members.  
 
Table 4 summarises the descriptive statistics on long term absenteeism. Overall, fewer than 
20 percent of respondents were ever absent from school for one year or more. The majority of 
those who did experience an absence from school were out for just one year, though a few 
were away from formal schooling for five years or more. Illness was the most common reason 
                                                            
2 In total, 996 household members from the four sites covered by the ES-SS have been to school. 
Unfortunately, 360 of these respondents were not available to answer questions on their education histories at the 
time of the survey. Of the 636 respondents for whom information is available, 263 have attended junior 
secondary school and 156 of these have been to senior secondary school.  
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for extended absence from school. The need to work on the farm or other household activities 
was also important. Poverty and the expense of schooling featured prominently as well. In a 
bad harvest year, some parents may not be able to afford the cost of schooling and their 
children may be forced to withdraw temporarily. 
 
Repetition of one or more grades is also relatively uncommon (Table 5). Less than 15 percent 
of respondents repeated a grade in primary school. The vast majority of these students 
repeated only once, and very few needed to repeat more than two years. The figures for junior 
and senior secondary school are somewhat higher at about 20 percent and 30 percent, 
respectively (not shown). It may be that students who have made it to post-primary education 
have more to gain by staying in school and trying to improve their performance when they do 
poorly. Students in primary school may be likely to quit school if they do not do well, rather 
than repeat a grade.  
 
Drop-out is a major problem facing Ethiopian educators (Table 6). Of the 636 students for 
whom there is information, 263 (41.3 percent) passed primary school and enrolled in the next 
level. The remainder dropped out of school between first and sixth grade. Of those who 
responded, the most important reason given for dropping out was the need to work on the 
farm. Other household activities and wage employment were also commonly cited, as was 
marriage. Marriage was frequently given as a secondary reason for quitting. Not enjoying 
school or failing were other important secondary reasons to drop out of school.  
 
 
5. Results: Determinants of Enrolment 
 
Table 7 provides probit estimates of the probability of enrolment in the four sites covered by 
the Education Sub-Sample Survey of children aged 7 to 18 who were not listed as head or 
spouse of the household and for whom the relevant data were available. The dependent 
variable is binomial with current enrolment status (student = 1; non-student = 0) as the 
dependent variable. Variable definitions and mean values for the relevant sample are also 
shown. Overall, 37 percent of children in the sample are currently enrolled. The enrolment 
rate for girls is 33 percent and for boys 42 percent. We control for a number of individual and 
household characteristics as well as site fixed effects. The latter are expected to be 
particularly important, since the site dummy variables include the effects of supply constraints 
(e.g., distance to school and quality of schooling available).  
 
The probability of being enrolled increases with age and decreases slightly with its square. 
This implies an inverse U-shaped relationship, which supports the dual descriptive 
hypotheses that: (1) the journey to school (which can be considerable) is often too dangerous 
or too long for young children; and (2) the value of older children to household production 
(e.g., opportunity cost) is often too great for them to be spared for schooling. Additional 
problems for older girls are the danger of abduction for marriage and embarrassment caused 
by the not uncommon lack of separate lavatories (Rose, et al. 1997). As discussed earlier, 
both late entry to primary school and early drop out are frequent occurrences.  
 
The coefficient on the dummy for being female indicates that the probability of enrolment is 
11 percent lower for girls than for boys, although it is significant only at the 20 percent level 
on a two-tailed t-test. Calculation of gross enrolment ratios (Table 1) indicates that the gross 
schooling participation rate for girls is only three-quarters of that for boys at the primary  
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level, and 60 percent as high at the secondary level, for the four sites surveyed in the ES-SS. 
The rather weak significance of the female dummy variable indicates that at least some of this 
striking gender bias in enrolments may be explained by the variables included in our 
estimation. However, this statement cannot be interpreted to mean that the difference between 
enrolment rates for boys and girls is fair, merely that there are observable reasons which help 
to explain the disparity.  
 
Whether or not a particular child is enrolled may depend upon the ages and activities of his or 
her siblings. The coefficient on birth order is negative and weakly significant, suggesting that 
children born earlier are more likely to be enrolled than children born later. Since we have 
controlled for age in the regression, this suggests that there is a preference for earlier born 
children to be educated. It may indicate a household time preference, since early born children 
who are educated may be expected to enjoy the returns to their schooling sooner than later 
born children.
3 Children are significantly more likely to be enrolled if they have siblings who 
are in school. This variable probably picks up a number of household specific fixed effects 
which may not be completely incorporated into the equation, including preferences for 
education and access to cash income.  
 
The number of dependants under the age of seven has a surprisingly positive and significant 
effect upon enrolment, whereas the number of dependants aged over 65 has no effect at all. 
This finding is somewhat unexpected, since children (particularly girls) may be needed to 
help care for dependants in the household, increasing the opportunity cost of their time. 
However, the inclusion of data on both boys and girls in the estimation may confound our 
results. We will return to this later when we disaggregate our findings by sex (Table 9).  
 
Children are significantly less likely to participate in schooling if they are not considered to 
be members of the household. The result is not surprising in that household members are 
expected to be weighted more heavily in the household utility function than non-members. 
Duties to remit to the household are also expected to be greater for members.  
 
The probability of enrolment rises with both consumption per adult equivalent (our proxy for 
income) and land per household member (a proxy for opportunity cost). The significant 
coefficient on the income variable suggests that credit is constrained in our sample, since 
income should not be an important constraint if households are able to borrow to pay school 
fees and other costs (Glewwe and Jacoby 1994; Glewwe and Ilias 1996). The opportunity cost 
variable is expected to be negative, since households with more land per member face greater 
requirements for labour. However, the positive and highly significant coefficient suggests that 
the land variable may actually reflect wealth, supporting the previous conclusion. The site 
primary school enrolment fee as a percentage of consumption per adult equivalent is included 
to approximate the financial burden to the household of sending a child to school. The 
coefficient is negative, as predicted, but not significant.  
 
                                                            
3 Hypotheses and results from the applied literature on birth order as a determinant of enrolment are 
mixed. Lloyd and Gage-Brandon (1994) predict that first-born children in Ghana have an educational advantage 
over middle children. However, they also predict that younger children may receive cash from their older 
siblings to pay for school expenses. Gomes (1984) found evidence of educational advantages of being first-born 
in Kenya. However, Parish and Willis (1993) find that late-born children are more educationally advantaged in 
Taiwan.   
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The dummy for being Muslim is negative and significant, indicating that Muslim children are 
less likely than either Orthodox or Other Christians to be enrolled. However, Weir (2000) 
showed that Muslim households demonstrated more positive attitudes toward education than 
others, suggesting that factors other than the pure utility of schooling (e.g., the lack of Muslim 
schools and lack of sex-segregated schools) may prevent Muslim children from attending 
school.  
 
As expected, the coefficients on the site variables are large and highly significant. The 
omitted site is Sirbana Godeti, an area with rich and relatively abundant farm land. Children 
are significantly more likely to attend school if they live in either of the three sites shown than 
if they live in Sirbana Godeti. This may reflect the higher opportunity costs of schooling in 
this site, since it is an area rich in farmland and near to urban centres.  
 
The most interesting finding for the purposes of this paper is that the coefficients on both 
mothers’ and fathers’ years of education are positive and significant. This indicates that for 
rural Ethiopia, the education of both parents matters and is important in creating educational 
benefits for their children. However, the coefficient on mother’s education was slightly higher 
and more significant. The intergenerational transfer of human capital in the form of schooling 
may have enormous and far-reaching consequences for the health, education and well-being 
of the household’s descendants. It is worth exploring in greater detail the mechanisms by 
which benefits may be passed from parents to their children.  
 
Education may have cognitive and non-cognitive effects. To understand better the importance 
of each, years of education of the mother and father are replaced with cognitive skill
4 and 
attitudes
5 (two possible outputs of education for which data are available) of each parent in 
the second equation of Table 8.
6 The results show that cognitive skill is not important and, 
whereas the mother’s attitudes have an influence, the father’s do not matter. Thus, we have 
been able to explain part of the mechanism by which mother’s education increases the 
likelihood of a child being enrolled. However, the particular way in which father’s schooling 
influences enrolment remains a mystery.  
 
To explore the role of attitudes further, we consider separately attitudes pertaining to the 
economic effects of schooling and attitudes pertaining to the social effects. Years of 
schooling are reintroduced, since there may be other relevant effects of schooling apart from 
attitudes. We find that the only important aspect of attitudes are mother’s attitudes regarding 
the economic effects of schooling. When we include attitudes along with years of schooling, 
mother’s education becomes insignificant, reinforcing our conclusion that the entire effect of 
                                                            
4 Cognitive skill was measured as the total score on a test of basic literacy (reading comprehension and 
writing) and numeracy (addition and subtraction), which was conducted alongside the survey questionnaire for 
those household heads and spouses who had ever acquired cognitive skill whether or not they had been to 
school. Weir (1998) provides a more detailed discussion of the survey instruments.  
5 Attitudes toward schooling were measured by constructing a Likert index based on responses to a set 
of agree/disagree and hypothetical situation questions designed to elicit opinions of the household head and 
spouse on the benefits of formal schooling. Negative responses received a score of -1, positive responses a score 
of +1 (or up to 3 for the hypothetical situation questions where stronger opinions were expressed), and non-
responses a score of zero. Responses were aggregated across questions to provide a single index score. Weir 
(1998) and Weir (2000) provide more information on the questions asked and methodology used to construct the 
index.  
6 Since the size and significance of the individual, household and site control variables do not vary 
much with different specifications of the parental education variables, we show only the results pertaining to 
parental human capital in Table 8. The other variables were all included in the estimation.   
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mother’s education upon the probability a child will be enrolled is in terms of creating more 
positive attitudes regarding the economic benefits of schooling. Father’s education continues 
to be significant even after the introduction of the attitude variables. Father’s attitudes 
regarding the social benefits of schooling are weakly significant in explaining the probability 
of enrolment. However, the continued significance of father’s schooling after controlling for 
attitudes once again indicates that there is some other effect of father’s education at work in 
raising the probability of enrolment. Educated fathers, by being more efficient in production 
(Weir 1999), may be able to overcome income and credit constraints upon schooling better 
than uneducated fathers.  
 
Replacing years of education of the mother with the ratio of years of mother’s education to 
total education of the mother and father provides a measure of women’s bargaining power 
within the household (equation 4).
7,8 The coefficient on mother’s power is large and highly 
significant, dwarfing the effect of father’s years of schooling. The coefficient on mother’s 
attitudes toward the economic benefits of schooling maintains its size and significance. Thus, 
it appears that if the mother has more education than the father, the shift in the balance of 
power in their favour empowers women within the household and they use this power to send 
their children to school.  
 
Table 9 shows that the results discussed above differ somewhat between the sexes. For girls, 
mother’s power in the household does not increase the probability of enrolment.
9 Moreover, it 
is the father’s education and attitudes toward the economic benefits of schooling which 
matter for girls, not the mother’s. Instead, mother’s attitudes towards the social effects of 
education are weakly significant (equation 5). By contrast, mother’s power and attitudes 
towards economic effects of schooling appear to be highly favourable to the probability that a 
boy will go to school (equation 6). These results may seem surprising. If mothers recognise 
the value of education for girls, they are expected to use their power in the household to 
increase the chances that their female children will go to school. However, if mothers with 
schooling feel that there are few benefits which will flow back to the household (or indeed to 
the girl herself) as a result of educating a daughter, there will be no such incentive. Rather, 
since girls provide a substitute for female labour in the household, women with more power 
in the household may be more inclined to use that power to keep their female children at 
home and send their sons to school.  
 
There are other differences between the two equations. While age has no effect on the 
likelihood of a girl’s enrolment, it is positive and significant for a boy, with the probability of 
school participation increasing at a decreasing rate with age. On the other hand, birth order 
                                                            
7 When both parents have no education, the power ratio is constructed to be 50-50. If the mother has 
some education and the father has none, the power ratio is 1. If the father has some education and the mother has 
none, the power ratio is 0.  
8 This measure of women’s power in the household is chosen in preference to a measure such as 
women’s income in relation to men’s income because it is quite difficult to measure individual incomes in rural 
areas, where men and women each contribute to total household production. Of course, the precise mechanism 
by which women’s education in relation to men’s education gives them additional bargaining power is unknown. 
It is possible that women who are educated are able to make greater contributions to total household income. 
Alternatively, they may command greater respect from their husbands than uneducated women either because of 
their family background or because of their cognitive skill and attitudes acquired in school. 
9 This confirms the finding of Knight and Song (2000) for rural China. Appleton, Chessa and Hoddinott 
(1999) found discrimination in favour of boys in terms of consumption expenditure in households without men 
in Uganda.   
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has no impact upon schooling for boys. However, girls born early are significantly more 
likely than those born late to attend school. Girls have a greater chance of being enrolled the 
more dependants younger than seven and the fewer dependants over the age of 65 are in the 
household. These results are somewhat surprising, suggesting that girls are less needed at 
home to look after younger siblings and more needed at home to help care for older 
household members. Land is not important to the enrolment decisions regarding girls, but has 
a strong, unexpectedly positive, impact upon boys’ enrolment probabilities, indicating that 
land reflects wealth rather than the opportunity cost of boys’ time. The enrolment 
probabilities of children of both sexes were strongly influenced by the presence of siblings 
who are enrolled. Muslim children of both sexes were each less likely to participate than their 
Orthodox or other Christian peers. The site dummy variables are insignificant in the girls’ 
enrolment equation, indicating that the probability of girls’ enrolment does not vary between 
the omitted site and the included sites. However, site dummies are all positive in the boys’ 
equation, showing that boys are less likely to be enrolled in the omitted site than in either of 
the three included sites. The omitted site, Sirbana Godeti, is unique in having higher 
participation rates for girls than for boys, though the rates for both sexes are quite low.  
 
Beyond the externality effects of parents’ education (within-household externalities), there are 
also externality effects of schooling in the neighbourhood. The neighbourhood education 
variables are average years of schooling of women (and men) in the neighbourhood aged 19-
39 (the age cohort of role models for the current cohort of school-age children), excluding 
education in the household. See Table 10.  
 
Equation 7 illustrates the case for boys and girls together. Here, education of women in the 
neighbourhood has a very strong and significant effect upon the probability of enrolment, 
whereas education of men in the neighbourhood has no significant impact. However, the 
situation is somewhat different for boys than for girls. The effect for boys is again clear: 
women’s education in the neighbourhood has a strong, significant impact and men’s 
neighbourhood-level education has no effect upon the probability of a boy being enrolled 
(equation 9). For girls, the effect of women’s education is much smaller and less significant, 
and men’s education in the neighbourhood also has a small, weakly significant effect 
(equation 8).  
 
Our findings on education at the neighbourhood level may be overstated if the neighbourhood 
education variables act as a proxy for unobserved determinants of enrolment which are 
common to everyone in the neighbourhood. However, as well as controlling for site-level 
fixed effects, equations 7-9 include several other neighbourhood variables which are intended 
to pick up neighbourhood-level income and endowments (e.g., the neighbourhood gross 
enrolment ratio, mean consumption per adult equivalent and percentage of households headed 
by a woman). The inclusion of these variables does not reduce the significance of the results 
on women’s education in the neighbourhood. In the girls’ enrolment equation, consumption 
(income) in the neighbourhood has a significantly positive effect, whereas the percentage of 
female-headed households has a significantly negative effect. There is no effect of living in a 
neighbourhood where the gross enrolment ratio is high. For boys, none of the neighbourhood-







6. Results: Delayed Entry to Primary School 
 
Current enrolment is only one part of the human capital story. For children who have ever 
been enrolled, the age at which they began school and whether they delayed starting in 
relation to their peers or beyond the government-mandated starting age may be important 
considerations. In this section we will estimate the determinants of the probability and 
duration of delayed entry to primary school. We will focus on the importance of mother’s and 
father’s schooling to the timing of initial enrolment.  
 
Variable definitions and means are provided in Table 11. The sample includes household 
members aged 12 to 24 who have ever attended school.
10 The official government starting age 
is seven. However, late entry is extremely common, and in many areas, older starting ages 
may be considered normal. Respondents were asked whether they had started school later 
than their peers. Data on the age at enrolment is also available. While only 49 percent of the 
sample perceived that they had entered school late, 91 percent were older than seven when 
they started. Two different dummy variables defining late entry are created. The first is set to 
one if the respondent started later than the peer group. The second is set to one if the 
respondent started after the age of seven. The determinants of each are compared. Finally, 
actual years delayed is calculated and regressed on a set of explanatory variables.
11  
 
Table 12 provides estimation results for three different dependent variables: the probability of 
starting later than the peer group (Delay: Perceived); the probability of starting later than the 
government starting age (Delay: Actual); and the number of years delayed beyond the 
government starting age (start age less seven, Delay: Years). Several control variables are 
included. Since the decision to enrol late was taken many years in the past in most cases, we 
do not have data on several potentially relevant variables, including household income at the 
time of the enrolment choice. It is also not possible to include education of the cohort of 19-
39 year old men and women in the neighbourhood, since the relevant groups will differ for 
older versus younger respondents.  
 
Age is included to determine whether there is a cohort effect. The probability of late entry 
decreases with age and increases slightly with its square in the actual delay probit, indicating 
that older respondents are less likely to have delayed entry than younger respondents over the 
entire range of the sample used. This suggests that the prevalence of late entry has risen for 
the recent cohort. There is no significant cohort effect on perceived delays or the number of 
years actually delayed. Whether or not girls are more likely to delay entry than boys depends 
upon the opportunity cost of their time. Were young girls’ labour more valuable to the 
household than that of young boys, girls would be more likely than boys to start school late. 
However, the dummy variable for sex is negative in the actual delay probit, indicating that 
girls are less likely than boys to delay entry to school. The coefficient is positive, though only 
weakly significant, in both the perceived delay probit and the years delayed regression. Birth 
order has a consistently negative, but insignificant effect. Thus, children born later may be 
less likely to delay school entry than their earlier-born siblings, but not significantly so.  
 
                                                            
10 Children younger than 12 were not included, since many younger children who have never been to 
school may enrol later. Including children from this age-group in the sample would result in the problem of 
censoring on the dependent variable. The majority of children in our sample who ever enrolled had done so by 
age 12. 
11 Years delayed are negative if the child started school early and zero if the child started on time.  
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A dummy indicating that the respondent lives in a house with a metal roof is included as a 
crude indicator of permanent household wealth. Respondents living in better quality housing 
are less likely to say that they started school later than their peers, but the difference is not 
significant at the ten percent level on a two-tailed t-test. The probability of actually delaying 
enrolment is not affected by household wealth. However, the number of years delayed is a 
significantly negative function of our proxy for wealth. No attempt has been made to include 
current household income in the equation, since current income may not accurately reflect 
income at the time of school entry, particularly for the older respondents in the sample. 
Endogeneity may exist if respondents who start school on time tend to be more successful 
subsequently, bringing greater wealth to the household. Since all respondents are either 
children or young adults living in the same home with both parents, house construction was 
most likely to have been completed before these children finished school, reducing the 
likelihood of this being an issue.  
 
Both Muslim and Christian respondents were more likely than Orthodox Christians to report 
starting school later than their peers. However, Muslim respondents were not found to be 
more likely to actually start late, though the number of years delayed was found to be 
significantly higher for Muslims than for Orthodox Christians. Other Christians were 
significantly less likely to actually start late and the number of years delayed was significantly 
lower than for Orthodox Christians.  
 
Respondents in Sirbana Godeit were more likely to report enrolling later than their peers than 
respondents in the other three sites. However, there were no differences between the sites in 
terms of the probability of actually enrolling late, although the number of years delayed was 
significantly lower in Imdibir than Sirbana Godeti.  
 
The most relevant finding from the point of view of the paper is that years of schooling of 
both the mother and father significantly reduce the probability that a respondent will report 
starting school later than his or her peers. Although mother’s education has an insignificantly 
positive effect upon the probability of actually delaying enrolment, it has a strong and highly 
significant effect to reduce the number of years actually delayed. Father’s education has a 
consistently negative effect, significantly reducing both the probability of actually delaying 
entry and the number of years delayed. Thus, parental education not only increases the 
probability of a child being enrolled (see Section 4) but it also increases the chances of 
initially enrolling on time. This has implications for potential educational attainment, 
particularly for girls, who may leave school earlier than boys because of early marriage or 
other factors (Rose, et al. 1997).  
 
Mothers’ education is replaced by mother’s power in the household (mothers years of 
schooling as a proportion of total education of the mother and father) in Table 13. Mothers’ 
power has no influence upon self-reported late starting, actual late starting or the number of 
years enrolment was delayed. However, the coefficient on mothers’ power in the equation 
including both boys and girls may not reflect differences in the importance of mothers’ 
educational power for boys versus girls.  
 
In Table 14, the interaction between being female and having a mother with power in the 
household is considered. Here, there are positive, significant coefficients on mother’s power 
in the household and significantly negative coefficients on the interaction between 
respondent’s sex and mother’s power. In households where the mother has more education  
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than the father, children face a greater likelihood of delayed entry. However, girls benefit 
from mothers’ educational power. Girls are less likely to delay entry than boys when their 
mother is more educated than their father, ceteris paribus.  
  
The dummy for being female tends to increase the likelihood of starting school later than 
ones’ peers but to lower the probability of starting after age seven. Girls delay entry by 2.4 
years longer than boys, ceteris paribus. However, the overall effect of being a girl in a 
household where the mother has some schooling and the father none is to reduce the delay by 
nearly three months. By contrast, the delay in enrolment for boys in a household where the 
mother has some education and the father has none is 1.2 years longer than in a household 
where the mother has no education and the father has some. The delay in enrolment for girls 
in a household where the father has some education and the mother has none is more than two 
and a half years longer than in a household where the mother has some education and the 
father has none. Perhaps this is a case of ‘like mother, like daughter’ and ‘like father, like 
son’. If so, future generations of girls will benefit from the education acquired by their 
mothers in relation to that acquired by their fathers. This suggests the possibility of a virtuous 
circle to reduce the gender gap in educational attainment.  
 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions  
 
Descriptive data from the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey and Education Sub-Sample 
Survey were presented to indicate the magnitude of the problems of low enrolment and late 
entry to primary school in rural Ethiopia. For the current cohort of children and young adults, 
the probability of being enrolled and of having enrolled late were estimated as functions of 
various characteristics of the child and of the village. The relatively low pseudo R
2 on each 
equation estimated in Sections 4 and 5 indicates that it was not possible to predict the 
probability of current enrolment or delayed enrolment accurately in many cases using the 
variables available. However, certain key characteristics were found to be important.  
 
Of particular interest from the point of view of understanding externalities to schooling were 
the findings on mother’s and father’s schooling and neighbourhood schooling. Years of 
education of both parents was found to influence the probability of enrolment, though the 
effect of mother’s education was slightly stronger than that of father’s education. Further 
analysis revealed that the effect of mother’s education works through changes in mother’s 
attitudes toward schooling, and particularly through her attitudes regarding the economic 
benefits of schooling. The effect of father’s education was found to be neither through 
cognitive changes nor attitudinal changes, suggesting that it has a more indirect effect (e.g., 
by increasing household income available for school expenses). Mother’s power in the 
household (measured as the ratio of years of schooling of the mother to years of schooling of 
both parents) had an independent effect upon enrolment. However, the effect was different for 
boys versus girls. Boys are more likely to be enrolled if their mother has more power in the 
household, while there is no significant influence of mother’s power upon girls’ enrolment. 
This may be because girls are quite useful in the household, freeing their mother for other 
tasks, or because they are less likely to share the benefits of their education with their parents, 
owing to the usual practice of living with the family of their husband after marriage. Boys 
also benefited more from the education of women in their neighbourhood than did girls, 
though both were significantly more likely to be enrolled if they lived in a neighbourhood 




Years of schooling of both mothers and fathers significantly reduces the likelihood of starting 
school later than the peer group and reduces the number of years delayed beyond age seven. 
However, neither has a significant effect (at the ten percent level) upon the probability of 
starting after age seven. This is probably because most children in the sample who ever went 
to school started later than the government’s official enrolment age. Mothers’ power in the 
household (as measured by the mother’s share of total parental education) had no effect on 
delayed entry for the sample as a whole. However, it was found to interact with the sex of the 
child, reducing the delay for girls and increasing it for boys. It may be that boys tend to follow 
the example of their father and girls to follow their mother. Thus, in households where the 
mother has more schooling than the father, boys will be at a disadvantage relative to girls. If 
so, gender biases in education will tend to be replicated from one generation to the next.  
 
The evidence that education is transferred from one generation to the next both within and 
between households indicates that two types of externalities exist: intra-household and inter-
household. Evidence of a third type of externality - from a girl’s parents to her in-laws - is 
provided by the finding that women’s power in the household influences the probability of 
enrolment of boys, but not girls. Even when power appears to reside with the mother, who 
might well be expected to value her daughters no less than her sons, the education of sons is 
favoured. This result offers indirect support for the hypothesis that parents will discount the 
value of schooling for children who are expected to leave the household. Thus, too little 
education will be provided for children when the possibility of internalising the benefits is 
reduced, as is often the case with investments in girls.  
 
This paper has attempted to contribute to the literature on externalities to schooling by 
considering two types of educational transfers, within-household and between-household. It 
appears that having educated parents, and particularly an educated mother, is important both 
to the probability of being enrolled and to the likelihood of starting school without an 
extended delay. Interestingly, father’s schooling was found to play an important within-
household role in the enrolment of both boys and girls, whereas mothers’ schooling seems to 
have a much stronger influence on boys’ enrolment than on girls’ enrolment. A different 
effect was found at the neighbourhood level. Here, the probability of enrolment of both boys 
and girls was found to be positively influenced by the education of women aged 19-39 living 
in the same neighbourhood, even after controlling for other possible neighbourhood effects. 
However, no such effect was found for men’s schooling. Taking the inter- and intra-
household findings together, there is strong evidence to support policies which expand 
women’s schooling, since there are two types of social benefit of doing so.  
 
Another purpose of this paper was to investigate some of the potential mechanisms through 
which intergenerational transfers of education may operate. In considering the outputs of 
schooling (i.e., cognitive skill, attitudes toward education and intra-household power) it was 
possible to show that the influence of mothers’ education is through her attitudes toward the 
economic benefits of schooling and through her power in the household. The influence of 
father’s education upon children’s enrolment could not be explained in terms of cognitive 
skill or attitudes. It may operate indirectly, perhaps by increasing household cash income to 
pay school fees and other expenses. If so, policies which reduce the costs of schooling may 
compensate for the low educational attainment of fathers in rural Ethiopia. To compensate for 
even lower stocks of mother’s education, policies are needed which improve mother’s 
attitudes toward schooling and increase mother’s bargaining power within the household (for  
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example, by providing disposable cash income which mothers control). In the long run, 
society will benefit from an expansion of girls’ schooling as a virtuous cycle of 
intergenerational and inter-household transfers of human capital may be sparked which will 
benefit children of both sexes. However, biases against girls persist and must be addressed by 
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Gross Enrolment Ratios 
 
   
Primary (Gr. 1-6) 
 
Secondary (Gr. 7-12) 
Survey Sample 
 
Male Female Total  Male Female Total 
 
 
ES-SS  (4  Sites)  50.9 38.0 44.4 30.4 18.1 24.1 
 
ERHS (15 Sites)  32.4  16.4  24.3  12.3  7.6  9.9 
 
 
GER = Number Enrolled/School-Aged Population (percentage) 







Net Enrolment Ratios 
 
   
Primary (Gr. 1-6) 
 
Secondary (Gr. 7-12) 
Survey Sample 
 
Male Female Total  Male Female Total 
 
 
ES-SS  (4  Sites)  26.8 20.4 23.6 16.4 10.4 13.3 
 
ERHS (15 Sites)  14.4  7.9  11.1  6.4  4.4  5.4 
 
 
NER = Number of School-Aged Popn. Enrolled/School-Aged Population (percentage) 
















   
  Percent 
 
Mean Yrs  Mode  Percent  Mean Yrs  Mode 
 
SIRBANA GODETI   60.5  5.3  4.0  81.6  4.9  2.0 
TURUFE  KETCHEMA  57.1 5.4  3.0 93.6 5.2  4.0 
IMDIBIR  29.4 4.4  2.0 89.0 4.3  1.0 
AZE  DEBOA  42.7 4.7  2.0 93.5 4.7  2.0 
        
ES-SS  SITES  45.7 5.0  4.0 90.9 4.8  2.0 
 
 
Note: Perceived years delayed is a self-reported indicator of having delayed starting school after ones peers. 
Actual years delayed is the number of years delayed starting school beyond the official starting age, seven. Mean 



















   
SIRBANA GODETI   32.1  1.6  1.0 
TURUFE KETCHEMA  21.2  1.7  1.0 
IMDIBIR  8.8 2.0 1.0 
AZE DEBOA  14.8  2.7  1.0 
    
ES-SS SITES  15.9  2.0  1.0   
 


















   
SIRBANA GODETI   7.8  1.2  1.0 
TURUFE KETCHEMA  18.2  1.4  1.0 
IMDIBIR 24.3  1.2  1.0 
AZE  DEBOA 4.3 1.3 1.0 
    
ES-SS SITES  14.2  1.3  1.0 
 
 







Progress and Attrition 
 
      





















SIRBANA  GODETI    21.4 53.4 78.6 81.3 71.7 48.9 
TURUFE  KETCHEMA  48.6 51.7 83.0 82.8 75.3 53.4 
IMDIBIR  41.8 48.5 78.7 79.7 71.6 43.6 
AZE  DEBOA  43.9 54.3 78.0 83.2 71.7 50.9 
        
ES-SS  SITES  38.8 52.0 79.5 81.7 72.6 49.4   
 
Note: Percent start primary is the percentage of people who have ever been to primary school in our sample. 
Percent complete primary is the percentage of those who started primary who completed sixth grade. Percent 
start junior is the percentage of those who completed primary who started junior secondary (at least seventh 
grade complete). Percent complete junior is the percentage of those who started junior secondary who completed 
eighth grade. Percent start senior secondary is the percentage of those who completed junior secondary who 
started senior secondary (at least ninth grade complete). Percent complete senior is the percentage of those who 












Probit Estimation: Probability of Current Enrolment (marginal effects) 










Child Attributes      
AGE_YRS   0.166 *  Age in years  12.09 
AGE_YRS2  -0.007 *  The square of age (years)  158.81 
FEMALE  -0.110a  Dummy: 1 if female  0.51 
BIRTH_ORDER  -0.052a  Sibling order: Oldest = 1, …, youngest = n  2.47 
SIB_ENROLLED   0.131  ***  Number of siblings currently enrolled  1.24 
NOT_MEMBER  -0.096 **  Dummy: 1 if not a household member  0.01 
      
Household Attributes      
NUM_LT7   0.093  ***  Number of children aged under 7  0.24 
NUM_GT65 -0.008  Number of adults aged over 65  1.53 
CONSAE   0.000 *  Consumption per adult equivalent (Birr)  97.89 
LAND_PC   0.667 **  Land per household member (hectares)  0.11 
HH_COST -0.275  School fees as a percentage of consae  0.19 
REL_MUSLIM -0.191  ***  Dummy: 1 if Muslim  0.17 
      
Parental Education      
EDYRS_MOTH   0.016 **  Years of schooling of the mother  0.49 
EDYRS_FATH   0.014 *  Years of schooling of the father  1.60 
      
Parental Cognitive Skill      
COGSKILL_M   Total cognitive skills score (0-17) - Mother  1.22 
COGSKILL_F   Total cognitive skills score (0-17) - Father  4.10 
      
Parental Attitudes      
ATT_MOTH   Score on likert attitude index - Mother  11.11 
ATT_FATH   Score on likert attitude index - Father  12.38 
ATTEC_MOTH   Score on attitude index - economic - Moth  2.68 
ATTEC_FATH   Score on attitude index - economic - Fath  2.92 
ATTSOC_MOTH   Score on attitude index - social - Mother  2.82 
ATTSOC_FATH   Score on attitude index - social - Father  3.35 
      
Mother’s Power      
ED_POWER_M    Years of schooling of Mother/Total  0.44 
      
Neighbourhood Education      
EDYRS_WOMEN    Average years of schooling of women aged 
19-39 in neighbourhood 
2.83 
EDYRS_MEN    Average years of schooling of men aged 19-
39 in neighbourhood 
6.35 
      
Site Fixed Effects       
TURUFE KECHEMA   0.492 ***  Dummy: 1 if household lives in site 10  0.27 
IMDIBIR   0.384  ***  Dummy: 1 if household lives in site 12  0.21 
AZE DEBOA   0.288 ***  Dummy: 1 if household lives in site 13  0.32 
      
Pseudo R
2   0.26     
Chi-Squared (2)   13.06     
Log Likelihood  -214.35     
Num. Observations   439     
 
 
Note: Standard errors have been adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data. Stars indicate 










Probit Estimation: Probability of Current Enrolment (marginal effects) 













Parental Education       
EDYRS_MOTH   0.016 **     0.004   
EDYRS_FATH   0.014 *     0.011 **   0.022 ** 
      
Parental Cognitive Skill      
COGSKILL_M     0.004     
COGSKILL_F     0.005     
      
Parental Attitudes      
ATT_MOTH     0.016 **     
ATT_FATH     0.004     
ATTEC_MOTH      0.056  ***   0.057 ** 
ATTEC_FATH      0.004    0.003 
ATTSOC_MOTH      0.011    0.011 
ATTSOC_FATH      0.018a   0.019 
      
Mother’s Power      
ED_POWER_M       0.216  *** 
      
Child Attributes?   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Household Attributes?   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Site Fixed Effects?   YES   YES   YES   YES 
      
Pseudo R
2   0.26   0.27   0.29   0.29 
Chi-Squared (2)   13.06   16.82   101.52   71.68 
Log  Likelihood  -214.35 -210.11 -206.90 -206.09 
Num. Observations   439   439   439   439 
 
 
Note: Standard errors have been adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data. Stars indicate 










Probit Estimation: Probability of Current Enrolment (marginal effects) 
Dependent Variable: ENROLLED (1 if currently in school; else 0) 
 
  










Child Attributes        
AGE_YRS   0.090  11.89   0.353 *** 12.30 
AGE_YRS2 -0.004  153.35  -0.014  ***  164.59 
BIRTH_ORDER -0.088  **  2.42  -0.012  2.52 
SIB_ENROLLED   0.186  *** 1.19    0.098 **  1.30 
NOT_MEMBER       0.252  0.01 
        
Household Attributes        
NUM_LT7   0.119 *  0.25   0.007  0.22 
NUM_GT59 -0.033  *** 1.59    0.003 1.48 
CONSAE   0.000  96.97  -0.000  98.86 
LAND_PC   0.253  0.10   2.058 *** 0.11 
HH_COST -0.673  0.13  -0.456  0.26 
REL_MUSLIM -0.138  *** 0.15  -0.226 *** 0.18 
        
Parental Education        
EDYRS_MOTH       
EDYRS_FATH   0.018a  1.63   0.041  *** 1.57 
        
Parental Attitudes        
ATTEC_MOTH -0.021  2.71    0.153  *** 2.64 
ATTEC_FATH   0.034  *** 2.72  -0.024 3.13 
ATTSOC_MOTH   0.034 *  2.61   0.005  3.03 
ATTSOC_FATH -0.004  3.08    0.025  3.63 
        
Mother’s Power       
ED_POWER_M   0.005  0.42   0.706 *** 0.45 
        
Site Fixed Effects         
TURUFE KECHEMA   0.200a  0.23   0.816  *** 0.31 
IMDIBIR   0.049  0.24   0.762 *** 0.18 
AZE DEBOA   0.094a  0.32   0.573  *** 0.31 
      
Pseudo R
2   0.31     0.41   
Chi-Squared (2)   0.77     54.62   
Log Likelihood  -99.07    -86.07   
Num. Observations   226     213   
 
 
Note: Standard errors have been adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data. Stars indicate 











Probit Estimation: Probability of Current Enrolment (marginal effects) 
Dependent Variable: ENROLLED (1 if currently in school; else 0) 
 
  
Eqn. 7 (Both Sexes) 
 
 
Eqn. 8 (Girls)  
 
 
Eqn. 9 (Boys) 
 
 
Parental Education      
EDYRS_MOTH     
EDYRS_FATH   0.018 *   0.013   0.036 *** 
    
Parental Attitudes     
ATT_MOTH     
ATT_FATH     
ATTEC_MOTH   0.076  *** -0.001   0.166  *** 
ATTEC_FATH   0.003   0.044 **  -0.024a 
ATTSOC_MOTH   0.012   0.039 *   0.001 
ATTSOC_FATH   0.023a  -0.005   0.030 
    
Mother’s Power     
ED_POWER_M   0.187 *  -0.073   0.689 *** 
    
Neighbourhood 
Education 
   
EDYRS_WOMEN   0.143  ***   0.066 *   0.183 *** 
EDYRS_MEN   0.020   0.049a  -0.044 
    
Child Attributes?   YES   YES   YES 
Household Attributes?   YES   YES   YES 
Site Fixed Effects?   YES   YES   YES 
Neighbourhood Vars?   YES   YES   YES 
    
Pseudo R
2   0.32   0.35   0.42 
Chi-Squared (2)   7.73   6.20   0.78 
Log Likelihood  -197.76  -92.25  -83.69 
Num. Observations   439   226   213 
 
 
Note: Standard errors have been adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data. Stars indicate 











Variable Definitions and Mean Values 
Determinants of Late Entry to Primary School (Ages 12-24, Been to School) 
 
  




Child Attributes    
AGE_YRS  Age in years  17.07 
AGE_YRS2  The square of age (years)  301.97 
FEMALE  Dummy: 1 if female  0.45 
BIRTH_ORDER  Sibling order: Oldest = 1, …, youngest = n  2.41 
    
Household Attributes    
ROOF  Dummy: 1 if roof made of metal, etc.  0.18 
REL_MUSLIM  Dummy: 1 if Muslim  0.13 
REL_ORTHODOX  Dummy: 1 if Orthodox Christian  0.32 
REL_XIAN  Dummy: 1 if Other Christian  0.55 
    
Parental Education    
EDYRS_MOTHER  Years of schooling of the mother  0.31 
EDYRS_FATHER  Years of schooling of the father  1.00 
    
Mother’s Power    
ED_POWER_M  Years of schooling of Mother/Total  0.47 
    
Site Fixed Effects     
SIRBANA GODETI   Dummy: 1 if household lives in Sirbana Godeti (Site 7)  0.09 
TURUFE KETCHEMA  Dummy: 1 if household lives in Turufe Ketchema (Site 10)  0.30 
IMDIBIR  Dummy: 1 if household lives in Imdibir (Site 12)  0.29 
AZE DEBOA  Dummy: 1 if household lives in Aze Deboa (Site 13)  0.32 
 
 
Note: Standard errors have been adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data. Stars indicate 









Probit Estimation: Probability of Late Entry to Primary School, Marginal Effects, 
Perceived Delay in Starting versus Actual Delay (Start Age>7) 
OLS Estimation: Years Delayed (Start Age-7) 
 




















CONSTANT       5.280 
AGE_YRS   0.007  -0.117 *  -0.130 
AGE_YRS2  -0.001   0.003 *   0.005 
FEMALE   0.112a a a a  -0.033 *   0.576a a a a 
BIRTH_ORDER -0.034  -0.010  -0.235 
ROOF  -0.216a   0.043  -1.74 *** 
REL_MUSLIM   0.388 ***   0.041   2.057 *** 
REL_XIAN   0.214 **  -0.023 ***  -1.162 ** 
      
EDYRS_MOTHER  -0.045 ***   0.025  -0.188 *** 
EDYRS_FATHER -0.026  **  -0.016a a a a  -0.178 * 
      
TURUFE KETCHEMA  -0.268 ***   0.012  -0.060 
IMDIBIR  -0.512 ***  -0.008  -0.739 *** 
AZE DEBOA  -0.535 ***   0.042   0.566 
 
Pseudo R
2   0.12   0.10   0.20 
Chi-Squared (2)   5.80   2.67   
F-Stat (2,3)       2.42 
Number of Observations   174   174   174 
 
 
Note: Standard errors have been adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data. Stars indicate 











Probit Estimation: Probability of Late Entry to Primary School, Marginal Effects, 
Perceived Delay in Starting versus Actual Delay (Start Age>7) 
OLS Estimation: Years Delayed (Start Age-7) 
 




















CONSTANT       5.726 
AGE_YRS   0.007  -0.109 **  -0.141 
AGE_YRS2  -0.001   0.003 **   0.005 
FEMALE   0.118a a a a  -0.034 ***   0.575a a a a 
BIRTH_ORDER -0.034  -0.010  -0.233 
ROOF  -0.202   0.045  -1.706 *** 
REL_MUSLIM   0.383 ***   0.038   2.040 *** 
REL_XIAN   0.215 **  -0.021 ***  -1.167 ** 
      
EDYRS_FATHER  -0.042 ***  -0.005  -0.254 ** 
ED_POWER -0.108    0.152  -0.772 
      
TURUFE KETCHEMA  -0.268 ***   0.021  -0.068 
IMDIBIR  -0.503 ***  -0.007  -0.707 *** 
AZE DEBOA  -0.529 ***   0.040   0.591 
 
Pseudo R
2   0.12   0.10   0.20 
Chi-Squared (2)   5.38   1.70   
F-Stat (2,3)       1.18 
Number of Observations   174   174   174 
 
 
Note: Standard errors have been adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data. Stars indicate 










Probit Estimation: Probability of Late Entry to Primary School, Marginal Effects, 
Perceived Delay in Starting versus Actual Delay (Start Age>7) 
OLS Estimation: Years Delayed (Start Age-7) 
 




















CONSTANT       4.120 
AGE_YRS   0.013  -0.082 **  -0.082 
AGE_YRS2  -0.001   0.002 *   0.004 
FEMALE   0.382 ***  -0.236 ***   2.408 *** 
BIRTH_ORDER -0.030  -0.008  -0.203 
ROOF  -0.215   0.028  -1.784 *** 
REL_MUSLIM   0.371 ***   0.017   1.894 *** 
REL_XIAN   0.222 **  -0.016 *  -1.125 ** 
      
EDYRS_FATHER  -0.044 ***  -0.003  -0.247 ** 
ED_POWER   0.169a   0.361 ***   1.239 ** 
FEMALE*ED_POWER  -0.589 ***  -0.543 ***  -3.874 *** 
      
TURUFE KETCHEMA  -0.265 ***   0.027  -0.048 
IMDIBIR  -0.512 ***  -0.025  -0.785 *** 
AZE DEBOA  -0.538 ***   0.026   0.539 
 
Pseudo R
2   0.12   0.15   0.21 
Chi-Squared (2)   5.02   13.09   
F-Stat (2,3)       10.56 
Number of Observations   174   174   174 
 
 
Note: Standard errors have been adjusted to account for the clustered nature of the data. Stars indicate 
significance using a two tailed t-test as follows: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.05; * = 0.10; a= 0.20.  
 
 